Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Rusya’nın Büyük Güç Olma Mücadelesi
Özet
Bu çalışma, Soğuk Savaş sonrasında Rusya’nın büyük güç olma mücadelesini, yaşadığı dönüşümleri ve karşılaştığı yapısal engelleri kapsamlı biçimde ele almaktadır. Sovyetler Birliği’nin dağılmasıyla büyük toprak, nüfus, askeri ve ekonomik kayıplara uğrayan Rusya, 1990’lı yıllarda Boris Yeltsin liderliğinde ağır ekonomik krizler, enflasyon ve toplumsal sorunlarla yüzleşmiştir. 2000’li yıllarda Vladimir Putin yönetimi altında yükselen uluslararası enerji fiyatları ve bol doğal kaynak gelirleri sayesinde ekonomik toparlanma sağlanmış, merkezi devlet otoritesi güçlendirilmiş ve askeri modernizasyona öncelik verilmiştir. Moskova; "Russkiy Mir" (Rus Dünyası) vizyonu ve bölgesel örgütler aracılığıyla eski Sovyet coğrafyasındaki nüfuzunu korumayı, ABD öncülüğündeki tek kutuplu düzene karşı çok kutuplu bir küresel sistem inşa etmeyi amaçlamıştır. Ancak sanayileşme ve üretime dayanmayan ekonominin hammadde ihracatına yüksek bağımlılığı, teknolojik yetersizlikler, azalan nüfus ve sınırlı demografik kapasite, Rusya’nın büyük güç sorumluluğunu ve statüsünü uzun vadede sürdürmesini zorlaştırmaktadır. Son olarak Orta Çağ yayılmacı zihniyetiyle başlatılan Ukrayna işgali, beklenenin aksine ağır uluslararası yaptırımlara, diplomatik yalnızlaşmaya ve Batılı ülkelerin savunma yatırımlarını artırmasına yol açarak Rusya’nın imajına, ekonomisine ve büyük güç iddiasına ağır bir darbe vurmuştur.
This study comprehensively examines Russia’s struggle to become a great power in the post-Cold War era, the transformations it experienced, and the structural obstacles it encountered. Suffering major losses in territory, population, military, and economic standing following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia faced severe economic crises, inflation, and social difficulties in the 1990s under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin. In the 2000s, under Vladimir Putin’s administration, rising international energy prices and abundant natural resource revenues facilitated an economic recovery, strengthened central state authority, and prioritized military modernization. Moscow aimed to maintain its influence across the former Soviet space through the "Russkiy Mir" (Russian World) vision and regional organizations, while seeking to build a multipolar global system against the US-led unipolar order. However, the economy's high reliance on raw material exports rather than industrialization and production, along with technological deficiencies, a declining population, and limited demographic capacity, make it difficult for Russia to sustain its great power status and responsibilities over the long term. Finally, the invasion of Ukraine, launched with a medieval expansionist mindset, resulted—contrary to expectations—in severe international sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and increased defense investments by Western nations, delivering a heavy blow to Russia’s image, economy, and great power ambitions.
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